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The Time Charter in Japan: A
Comparison
Hideo Yoshimoto*
I. THE CONCEPT OF TmvE CHARTER
Broadly defined, a time charter is an express contract for certain
uses of a vessel. The owner or lessor of the vessel agrees to let the
vessel to the charterer for a certain period of time. The charterer
then agrees to pay hire to the owner or lessor computed at a specified
rate and for a specified time period.' Because the vessel will be used
by the charterer for an agreed time period and the hire will be paid
by the charterer to the owner or lessor for a certain period, the tirlie
charter is accordingly said to be an agreement similar to a lease of
a vessel, a bareboat charter, or a charter by demise.
To examine the concept of a time charter, we must take into
consideration what types of use of the vessel fall within the category.
In this respect, early American court decisions recognize that under
the more familiar time charter, the charterer does not contract for
the vessel per se, but rather contracts for the service of the vessel
rendered by the owner through the owner's master and crew.3 The
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1. [See Atlantic Banana Co. v. "Calanca," 342 F.Supp. 447, 453-54 (D.C.N.Y. 1972)
(definition of time charter). -EDs.]
2. Gebb, The Demise Charter: A Conceptual and Political Analysis, 49 TuL. L. REv.
764, 765 (1975) (citing Leary v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 607 (1972)) [hereinafter
Gebb].
3. Gebb, supra note 2, at 765 (citing Reed v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 591, 601
(1871); Bergan v. International Freighting Corp., 254 F.2d 231, 233, 1958 A.M.C. 1303, 1304
(2d Cir. 1958)).
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relationship between the owner and time charterer may be described
as that of private carrier and shipper. 4 Although a time charterer
acquires use of the whole reach of the vessel, he does not obtain a
property interest.5 Legal possession, though not necessarily exclusive
control, remains with the owner. 6 The time charterer neither assumes
the general liabilities of the demise charterer, nor benefits from
statutes limiting liability.
7
I. Two TYPES OF CHARTERPARTY UNDER THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
LEASE OF THE VESSEL (CHARTER BY DEMSE) AND CHARTER NOT BY
DEMISE
A. Lease of the Vessel (Charter by Demise)
This type of use of the vessel includes a lease of the vessel and
charter by demise of the vessel. Charter by demise is further divided
into types:
(1) Locatio Navis (bareboat charter);
(2) Locatio Navis et operarum magistri et nauticarum (charter by
demise).
B. Charter Not by Way of Demise (Locatio operis vehendrum
mecium)
According to one author, the charter not by way of demise further
divides into three types: 8
(1) Contracts for the use of the ship, on a voyage or series of
voyages, in carrying goods to be shipped by the charterers, or in
their names. The charterer agrees to pay in proportion to the goods
carried, or a lump sum for the voyage, or in proportion to the time
occupied;
(2) Contracts similar to (1), but by which liberty is given to the
charterer to use the ship for the purpose of taking the goods of
other shippers, and to require the master to give bills of lading for
goods so shipped; and
4. Gebb, supra note 2, at 765 (citing Clyde Commercial S.S. Ltd. v. United States
Shipping Co. (The Santona), 152 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1907)).
5. Gebb, supra note 2, at 766 (citing Bergan v. International Freighting Corp., 254 F.2d
231, 232, 1958 A.M.C. 1303, 1304 (2d Cir. 1958)).
6. Gebb, supra note 2, at 766 (citing United States v. Shea, 152 U.S. 178, 187 (1894)).
7. Gebb, supra note 2, at 766 (citing In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d 1013,
1969 A.M.C. 1442 (2d Cir. 1969)).
8. CARVER, CARRIAGE BY SEA, Vol. 1, para. 324, at 277 (12th ed.) [hereinafter CARVER).
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(3) Contracts for the service of the ship for a period of time, during
which the charterer is to have the right, within agreed limits, to
direct how the ship shall be used, and is to pay in proportion to
the time occupied.
For purposes of this article, type (1) will be termed voyage charter-
party, type (2) a sub-voyage charterparty, and type (3) a time
charterparty (prevalent in the shipping industry throughout the world).9
C. Charter by Demise
According to one commentator, where "the whole, or substantially
the whole, of the ship's services are employed by one person or set
of persons," the parties will memorialize the agreement in a document
called a charterparty.'0
All charterparties, however, are not contracts of carriage. Often,
the ship itself and the control over its workings and navigation are
temporarily transfered to the persons using the ship. In such a case
the contract is really one of leasing the ship, subject, of course, to
the express terms of the charterparty. "The liabilities of the ship
owner and the charterer to one another are to be determined by the
law which relates to the hiring of chattels, and not by reference to
the liabilities of carriers and shippers."" Further discussion of English
law treatment of these catagories can be found at Section V (A) of
this article.
III. TIME CHARTER AND VOYAGE CHARTER
To distinguish the time charter from the voyage charter, the
following classifications are used by scholars in Japan:
A. Classification Based on Act of the Carriage or Ability of the
Carriage
Contracts directed to carriage of the cargo are voyage charters. In
contrast, time charters are directed to the capability of the carriage
of the cargo.1 2
9. In contrast, the type of use mentioned in (1) is termed by Scrutton as the Bareboat
Charter or Net Charter, and the type of use the vessel mentioned in (3) is termed a Gross
Charter. ScRurroN, CHARTERPARTiEs AND Bns or LADiNG, sec. IV, art. 24, at 45 (18th ed.)
[hereinafter ScRurroN].
10. CaRVER, supra note 8.
11. CARVER, supra note 8, para. 318, at 272; ScRuTroN, supra note 9, art. 25, at 47.
12. HAGI-ARA, Tim CARTER, at 334 (copy on file at the offices of the author).
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B. Classification Based on the Charter Period
Where the voyage determines the charter period, it is a voyage
charter. On the other hand, where the charter is determined by a
designated time period, it is a time charter.
C. Classification Based on the Type of Contract
While the time charter purports to have a carrying ability of the
vessel during the period of the charter, designation of loading and
discharging of the cargo is subject to the intention of the charterer.
This agreement is a type of charterparty contract. The voyage charter,
by which the owner agrees to carry the specific cargo from the
specified loading port to specified discharging port, however, is a
type of contract of affreightment.
3
D. Classification Based on Whether Possession and Control of
the Vessel is Transferred to the Charterer
In a bareboat charter and with a charter by demise, the possession
and control of the vessel during the period of charter transfers
entirely from the owner to the charterer. With voyage charters and
time charters, however, the owner of the vessel retains possession
and control of the vessel. Accordingly, this type of charter is called
a simple charter.1 4
E. Classification Based on Other Methods
The modern practice of chartering vessels typically involves either
a voyage charter requiring a specified number of consecutive voyages
for the carriage of cargo, or for as many voyages as the vessel can
travel within a certain period. In addition, some special agreements
entail the payment of the freight or charter hire based on a certain
time period rather than on a proportion of the quantity of cargo
carried. Some specific contracts, however, allow only voyage char-
terparty agreements, and not time charterparty agreements, even
though the charterer is substantially directing the vessel to carry the
specific cargo from a specific pick-up port to a specific discharge
port.
13. Id. at 335, 336.
14. Id.
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Given the various types of contracts being formed today, there is
still some confusion as to the classifications of time charter and
voyage charter. Despite the blurring of the distinctions between the
time charter and the voyage charter some differences remain between
the character of the two types of contracts. For example, the time
charteris a contract for use of the vessel, whereas the voyage charter
is a contract for the carriage of the goods. Therefore, under the
voyage charterparty, problems regarding demurrage and dispatch
money can arise. The time charterparty, however, does not involve
a problem of such demurrage and dispatch money; instead, the time
charterparty involves problems of off-hire.
IV. TnM CHARTER AND TME CHARTER BY DEWMISE
A. The Classification Based on a Legal Charter of the Contract
Japanese statutory law does not stipulate provisions to be appli-
cable for the time charterparty. Accordingly, interpretations thereof
rely on opinions of Japanese scholars or court decisions. Presently,
however, neither court decisions nor scholars in Japan have dealt
adequately with the legal character of the time charter.
In contrast, American law recognizes the contract of the time
charter by demise as the lease of the vessel whereby the charteier
acquires from the owner the exclusive right to possess and control
the vessel for a stipulated period.15
Although the owner does not part with legal title, the demise
charterer effectively becomes the owner of the vessel in most respects 6
and is commonly identified as the owner pro hac vice.'7 The master
is thereafter under the charterer's direction, 8 the crew are the
charterer's men,' 9 and the vessel engages in the charterer's business.
2
0
15. Gebb, supra note 2, at 764 (citing Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 1963 A.M.C.
1373 (1963)).
16. "The right of special ownership acquired by the demise charter does not, for example,
subject the vessel to the general debts of the charterer. McGahern v. Koppers Coal Co., 108
F.2d 652, 1940 A.M.C. 457 (3d Cir. 1940). Certain officers and agents appointed by the
demise charterer, however, have unrestricted authority to create maritime liens for necessaries
supplied to the vessel. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, § 30(R), 46 U.S.C. § 973 (Supp. I, 1971)."
Gebb, supra note 2, at 764.
17. Id. (citing Reed v. The Yaka, 373 F.2d 286, 289, 1963 A.M.C. 1373, 1375-76 (1963);
Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 286, 289, 1948 A.M.C. 695, 698 (Ist Cir. 1947)).
18. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 701, 1962 A.M.C. 1142, 1145 (1962).
19. Bergan v. International Freighting Corp., 254 F.2d 231, 232, 1958 A.M.C. 1303, 1304
(2d Cir. 1958).
20. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412, 1963 A.M.C. 1373, 1375-76 (1963).
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The charterer's obligations to the vessel's owner essentially consist
of paying hire for the charter period, 2' and exercising ordinary
diligence in the care of the vesseln The charterer's obligations to
third parties are essentially those of an owner.Y The demise charterer
also is accorded the umbrella of limitation of liability, however, if
the statutory criteria ("in case he shall man, victual, and navigate
such vessel at his own expense, or by his own procurement") have
been satisfied.24
It is said that the demise charter is governed under British Law
by general common law principles relating to a contract of hire of
chattels.25 Arguably, Articles 601 through 622 of the Civil Code of
Japan should apply, mutatis mutandis, to this contract.
The time charterer by demise has a right of possessory action by
the Civil Code of Japan to protect his possession of the vessel from
any disturbance thereto, and to recover it from any depredation
thereof, if he is deprived of it by any third person. The Japanese
Civil Code also grants charterers by demise the right to a claim
against any obstructionist or depredator for compensation due to
loss or damage caused by such depredation. Time charterers, how-
ever, do not have any possessory action under Articles 198, 199 and
200 of the Civil Code, because they do not have possession of the
vessel under the contract. Accordingly, under the time charter, only
the owner has a right of possessory action under Japanese Law.
The time charterer also does not have general authority to give
direct orders or instructions to the master and crew of the vessel in
connection with a navigable matter 26 of the vessel, because the owner
21. United States v. Shea, 152 U.S. 178, 189 (1894).
22. Nicholson Transit Co. v. Nicolson Universal S.S. Co., 60 F.2d 90, 91, 1932 A.M.C.
1049, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 1932); Mulvancy v. King Paint Mfg. Co., 256 F. 612, 614 (2d Cir.
1919).
23. Gebb, supra note 2, at 765 (citing Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412, 1963 A.M.C.
1373-76 (1963); Keer-McGee Corp. v. Law, 479 F.2d 61, 1973 A.M.C. 1667 (4th Cir. 1963);
In re United States, 259 F.2d 608, 1959 A.M.C. 982 (3rd Cir. 1958); Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping
Co., 163 F.2d 286, 289, 1948 A.M.C. 695, 698 (Ist Cir. 1947)). The demise charterer also
carries certain statutory obligations such as the owner's duty to locate and mark a sunken
vessel under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, (33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970); see
Marine Leasing Serv., Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 328 F. Supp. 589, 1971 A.M.C.
1329 (E.D. La. 1971) aff'd per curiam, 471 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1973)), and sole liability for
compliance with the United States inspection laws. 46 U.S.C. § 497 (1970).
24. Gebb, supra note 2, at 765 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1970). See also In re United
States, 259 F.2d 608, 1959 A.M.C. 982 (3d Cir. 1958)).
25. CARVER, supra note 8, para. 318, at 272; ScRuTToN, supra note 9, art. 25, at 47, 48.
26. Navigable matters include equipping the vessel to meet the ship's navigational needs,
maintenance and repair of the ship, administration of sanitation, and medical treatment for
crew members during the ship's navigation. Other navigable matters include supply of food,
oil for the engine and kitchen departments, drinking water and store for the crew members,
and the determination of plans for works on the vessel. Id.
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of the vessel retains control over navigable matters. The time char-
terer, however, does have a limited power to give direct orders or
instructions to the master and crew of the vessel in accordance with
the provisions of the time charterparty so that he will be able to
carry on his commercial matters.27
One reason why the time charterer has this authority under the
standard form of time charterparty is that the owner of the vessel
retains possession of the vessel through that of the crew master who
is a servant of the owner. The time charterer does not gain possession,
and the master and the crew are not the servants of the time charterer.
Accordingly, the time charterer does not directly control the man-
agement of the ship's sea transportation business. Thus, except to
some extent as agreed by the time charterparty, the charterer's
command of the vessel remains limited.
The time charterer by demise has a general power over both
navigable and commercial matters to conduct and manage the sea
transportation business as his own business. A time charterer by
demise also has the power of direct control and instruction over the
master and the crew, who are his servants.
As to the relative positions between the master and crew and the
time charterer in connection with the rendering of their services for
navigable matters under the time charterparty, it is considered that
the vessel functions through the work of the master and crew. They
work under the direct command of the owner on behalf of the time
charterer, in accordance with the time charter contract. Accordingly,
the master and crew render their services only for their employers
(the owners) based on the employment agreement with them, not for
the time charterers. Services rendered for commercial matters fail
into this same relationship between the master and crew and the time
charterer.
This arrangement results in a relative legal position between the
ship's owner and the time charterer such that the time charterparty
is the agreement for the use of the vessel by the time charterer, with
the services being rendered by the master and crew by instruction of
the ship's owner in accordance with the employment agreement.
Correspondingly, the time charterer has no legal duty to equip the
27. The commercial matters include selecting the cargo to be shipped by the shipper for
the proposed transportation, receiving the cargo, and loading, discharging or delivering of the
cargo. Other commercial matters concern the Bills of Lading, supply of the fuel oil, and boiler
water, and other matters necessary or incidental to carrying out the sea transportation business.
Id.
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vessel or to prepare the vessel for navigation for matters which the
ship's owner, leasor of the vessel, demise charterer, or bareboat
charterer is responsible.
Other Japanese scholars opine that the time charterer does have a
legal obligation under the time charterparty agreement to equip the
vessel and to prepare all things necessary for a commencement of
the ship's navigation, similar to the time charterer by demise.28 This
view, however, understates the relative character between the time
charter and the time charter by demise. Scholars supporting this view
appear to rely only on one decision by the Supreme Court of Germany
rendered in 1901 in a time charter by demise case.
This view has lost support in Japan, due chiefly to two more
recent decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of West Ger-
many. Both cases discuss time charters. One case relates to the
Deuzeit time charterparty in the year of 1956, and the other relates
to the Balentime charterparty in the year of 1957.
The Balentime charterparty, and the New York form for time
charterparty as amended, prevail in the shipping industry throughout
the world providing standard time charterparty agreements. In the
performance of the agreement by such standard forms, two types of
time charterparty agreements are found in common shipping practice:
(1) Where the time charterparty agrees with the cargo owner to
carry the cargo by the time chartered vessel for himself, the time
charterer (cargo owner) does not intend to make an agreement with
the ship's owner of the affreightment of the cargo by the vessel.
In such case, the time charterer (cargo owner) holds the legal
position of the cargo carrier to carry the cargo for himself by the
vessel with services to be rendered by the ship's owner. The ship's
owner is deemed to be the sub-contractor of the time charterer
(cargo owner) to perform the ship's navigation in compliance with
the intentions of the cargo owner.
(2) Where the parties agree to the time charterparty in order to
have the non-cargo owner use the vessel to carry the cargo for
another shipper, or the consignee, the time charterer is deemed to
be an independent carrier. The ship's owner merely provides the
time charterer a function or facility of the vessel in order to meet
the time charterer's needs for any particular commercial transaction.
Thus, the ship's owner becomes a navigator only as an independent
sub-contractor with the time charterer.
28. See generally CAvER, supra note 8.
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B. Classification Based on Economic Standpoints
1. Indirect Expenses for the Vessel
Indirect expenses for the vessel include: (1) Repayment of the value
of the vessel; (2) interest accrued on a loan debited by the owner;
and (3) a dividend fund to be divided among shareholders of the
owner. By Japanese commercial law, an accumulating fund must be
reserved by the owner's account along- with an insurance premium
to be paid by the owner for insurance of the vessel, overhead
expenses, and taxes levied on the vessel. These expenses are on the
owner's accounts; the time charterer has no obligation to pay such
expenses.
2. Direct Expenses for the Vessel
Direct expenses for the vessel include: (1) The navigational expenses
incurred from complying with the time charterer's requirement to
carry cargo for his commercial transaction; (2) wages and provisions
for the ship's crew; (3) maintenance expenses for the vessel; (4) fuel
costs for the kitchen department, (5) costs of the diesel oil consumed
and the up-keep of the engine; (6) expenses of drinking water; (7)
repair of the vessel; (8) costs of the supplies and store necessary for
the deck and engine departments; (9) charges for medical treatment
and sanitation of the crew; (10) consul's cdrtificate charges for the
master and officers on board the vessel; (11) charges for preparation
of winch or derrick together with wheel and wire-rope in the usual
degree of quality (each having a cipaeity of less than two tons for
loading or discharging of the cargo); and (13) wages foi winchmen
who shall be provided at each winch and insurance premium. Under
the time charterparty, these items are on the owner's accounts, but
not on the time charterer's account. The owner bears these costs and
expenses because the owner has a genera power and obligation to
operate the ship's navigation and to control the master and crew in
compliance with the requirements of the time charterparty agreement.
The time charterer by demise of the vessel will have to pay these
items of costs and expenses because the time charterer by demise has
the general power to conduct, and obligation for, the ship's navi-
gational matters and to control the master and crew who are the
servants of the time charterer by demise to carry out his commercial
transaction.
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3. Expenses Necessary for the Voyage of the Vessel
These expenses are those incurred from the ship's voyage to comply
with time charterer's commercial transaction requirements. They in-
clude:
(1) costs of fuel and diesel oil to be consumed for the ship's
navigation to complete the voyage as designated by the time char-
terer;
(2) The port charges imposed by the port authority on the vessel in
each port into which the vessel travels for the commercial transaction
(these expenses involve tonnage dues, port dues, pilotage, towage,
wharfage, charges for use of mooring buoy, and handling charges
for mooring ropes at the wharf and the stevedoring charges);
(3) The costs of boiler water;
(4) Canal dues, and the employment charge of the quartermaster
who must be employed for the passage of the canal; light dues;
charges for a consul's certificate to the things other than that of
the master; officers and crew, pier charge; agency fees employed
by the time charterer; costs of the provisions for the persons who
serve on the works for the loading; store and stem (including
expenses for the use of dunnage and shifting board for the loading
of the cargo); charges for discharging; tally; delivery of the cargo;
,'charges for an inspector of hatch coming; fumigation; and costs of
the ropes or chain which may be specially required to use for the
loading or discharging of the cargo as a custom of the port or by
order of the port authority.
The time charterer bears these costs and charges because these
expenses will have been incurred for and from the activities of the
vessel and other things necessary and incidental to complete the
voyage as designated by the time charterer for his commercial trans-
action pursuant to the time charterparty. For the same reason, time
charterers by demise also bear the costs of such expenses.
V. Tim TH~oms oF ScHoLARs AND Cotnur CASES
A. English Law
As set forth in Section II. (A) above, under English law we typically
find two types of charterparty: (1) the charterparty by demise; and
(2) charterparty not by way of demise.
1. Charterparty by Demise
The charterparty by demise is of two kinds; (1) locatio navis,
where the hull is the subject matter of the charterparty, and (2)
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locatio navis et operarum magistri et nauticorum, under which the
ship passes to the charterer in a state fit for the purpose of mercantile
adventure.
In both cases the charterer becomes, for the time being, the owner
of the ship (owner pro hac vice of the vessel). Master and crew
are, or become for all intents and purposes, the charterer's servants,
and through them the possession of the vessel is in him. The owner,
on the other hand, divests himself of all control over the ship or
over the master and crew. His sole right is to receive the stipulated
hire and to take back the ship when the charterparty ends. During
the currency of the charterparty, therefore, he is under no liability
to third persons whose goods may have been conveyed upon the
demised ship, or who may have done work or supplied stores for
the ship; those persons must look only to the charterer who has
taken his place.
29
2. Charterparty Which is Not a Demise
The charterparty which does not operate as a demise may be
classified as a locatio operis vehendarum mercium. Though it confers
on the charterer the temporary right to have his goods loaded and
conveyed in the ship, ownership remains in the original owner. In
addition, the possession of the ship remains in the original owner
through the master and crew, who continue to be his servants. The
existence of the charterparty, therefore, does not necessarily divest
the owner of liability to third persons whose goods may have been
conveyed on the ship nor does deprive him of his rights as owner.
Carver has divided the charterparty not by way of demise into the
following three classes:
(1) Contracts for the use of the ship on a voyage or services of
voyages, in carrying goods to be sliipped by the charterer, or in his
name. The charterer agrees to pay for the vessel either in proportion
to the goods carried, or a lump sum for the voyage, or in proportion
to the time occupied;
(2) contracts similar to the one described above, but by which liberty
is given to the charterer to use the ship for the purpose of taking
goods of other shippers, and to require the master to give bills of
lading for goods so shipped; and
(3) contracts for the services of the ship for a period of time, during
which the charterer is to have the right, within agreed limits, to
29. 35 HAISBURY, LAw OF ENGLAND, part 5, § 1, at 249-50.
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direct how the ship shall be used, and is to pay for her in proportion
to the time occupied. 30
Carver states that this third type of contract comes within the time
charter not by way of demise.31 In this respect, Scrutton states that
under the ordinary form of time charter, the owner agrees with the
time charterer to render services for a designated period by his master
and crew to carry goods put on board his ship by or on behalf of
the time charterer. 32 The ship owner's remuneration is usually termed
"hire," and is generally calculated at a monthly rate based on the
tonnage of the ship. 33 The meaning of the words "to render services
... by his master and crew," are interpreted in England and other
U.K. countries to equal "to render 'function' or 'facilities' of the
vessel ... by his master and crew." However, Scrutton states further
that recent developments in chartering practice have tended to obscure
the distinction between time charter and voyage charter. 34 For ex-
ample, provision is sometimes made for a specific number of con-
secutive voyages, or for as many voyages as the vessel can perform
within a certain period.3
5
In addition, British Courts have determined that the time charter-
party by a form of Balentime charter or New York produce time
charterparty is similar to a time charter not by way of demise. Words
common to the modern time charters (e.g. "let," "letting," "hire,"
"hiring," "delivery," and "redelivery") are really only apt in charter
by demise. According to Scrutton, however, the words "let," "let-
ting," "hire," "hiring" serve to distinguish such charters from
voyage charters. Scrutton contends they do not in themselves char-
acterize such charters as charters by demise. 36 In this respect, Carver
maintains that the modern form of time charterparty is, in essence,
one by which the ship owner agrees with the time charterer that
during a certain named period he will render services by his servants
and crew to carry the goods which the time charterer puts on board
his ship. 37 The provision as to delivery of the vessel at the termination
of the charterparty redelivery merely means that whatever possession
30. CARVER, supra note 8, at 277.
31. Id.





37. CtRvE.R, supra note 8, at 312-13.
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of the vessel the charterers might take should be relinquished by
them within the agreed time and at the ports named.
Carver further notes that in Italian State Rys v. Mavrogardatos,
the word "redelivery" in a clause providing for the redelivery of the
vessel by charterer to ship owner was not an apt word in a charter-
party which was not a demise of the ship; that the ship was redelivered
when the owner was enabled to reserve control of the ship; and that
where, as in that case, the owner withdraws the ship from the service
of the charterer, any further action by the latter in the way of
redelivering her was prevented.38 According to Carver, it is common-
place that the phraseology adopted in the case of the charter of a
ship where its services are put at the disposal of a charterer but it
is not a demise, is deceptive.3 9 The ship is not leased or withdrawn.
The services of the boat and those of the crew are put at the disposal
of the charterers when the charter begins. When the withdrawal of
the ship is spoken of, then, it merely means that those services are
no longer supplied.
A charterparty may be made for purposes other than the carriage
of goods, for example, for passenger service, or for towage or for
salvage. Such contracts, however, fall outside the scope of this
book, and the rules with regard to contracts of carriage may not
be applicable to them. Most commonly, charterparties are made for
the purpose of securing to the charter the use merely of the ship
on a particular voyage; or for services of voyages.
40
B. American Law
According to American admiralty law scholars Gilmore and Black:
The first problem is of course that o.f distinguishing the demise
from the regular time and voyage charters. The test is one of
'control;' if the owner retains control over the vessel merely carrying
the goods furnished or designated by the charterer, the charter is
not a demise; if the control of the vessel itself is surrendered to the
charterers, so that the master is his man and the ship's people are
his people, then we have to do with a demise. As the Supreme
Court has said, 'To create a demise the owner of the vessel must
completely and exclusively relinquish possession, command, and




40. CARVR, supra note 8, at 272-273.
41. G. G.MmE & C.L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF AnMntunm, sees. 4-21, at 240-41 (2d
ed. 1975).
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In the forms actually used for chartering today, it is usually quite
clear which of these arrangements is intended. It is common practice,
as well, for the charter to contain an express stipulation in this
regard; the time charter we have examined . . . expressly provided
that it is not to be construed as a demise; it could not be in any
case, for, as in most time charters, it is perfectly clear that the
owner retains control over the navigation and management of the
vessel.
A few cases occur in which a fictitious "demise" is used as a
sham to take the real owner out of the danger zone of liability,
particularly for personal injuries.
4z
Under American law, as under English law, there is a distinction
between demise charters, sometimes called "bareboat" charters, and
"time" or "voyage" charters. With demise charters, the charterers
take over the vessel and provide master, crew, provisions, insurance
and operational control, becoming the owner pro hac vice. As regards
third persons, the demise charterers are, in effect, the real owners.
This is not so with a time charterer. A time charterer retains many
of the characteristics of the contract of affreightment, where the
charterers merely take over the vessel's cargo carrying capacity.4 3
There is seldom any difficulty in distinguishing voyage charters
from other types of charters because they are merely contracts of
affreightment for one voyage. Difficulty has sometimes arisen in the
past in distinguishing between time charters and demise charters.
Today, however, the distinction between these two types of charter
is well-established in American law and there is seldom any difficulty
in determining which type of charter is involved.
American law on the difference between these charters was settled
in a series of cases decided by the United States Second Circuit Court
of Appeals between 1909 and 1911. The Second Circuit, which sits
in New York City, is the leading maritime court in the United States,
and its decisions are highly regarded.
The first of these cases is Clyde Commercial Steamship Co. v.
West India Steamship Co.4 Clyde concerned a dispute over loss of
time due to quarantine restrictions placed upon the vessel because of
a fever developed by certain crew members. The court discussed the
nature of the time charter, stating:
42. Id. at 241.
43. Id.
44. 169 F. 275 (2d Cir. 1909).
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It will thus be seen that the owner officered, manned, and
provisioned the vessel, was in entire control of her navigation, and
bound to maintain her during the charterparty in good condition.
The expression 'delivery' of the vessel to the charterer and 'deliver'
by it at the end of the term to the owner is to be construed in
connection with these provisions and with the further provision that
she was to be 'placed at the disposal of the charterers' to extent of
the space agreed upon.
We entertain no doubt that the charter did not amount to a
demise of the vessel-if she had been at fault for a collision during
the term, it would scarcely be contended that the charterer would
be personally responsible.
45
Another case is more closely in point. It involves a collision between
two vessels, the vessel at fault being under charter at the time of the
collision. 46 At the time of the collision, the supercargo was actually
navigating the Volund as its pilot and the captain was ashore.
Nevertheless, the court held that the collision was the responsibility
of the owners, not the charterers.47
A third case involved a collision between a vessel and a dock.
4
1
Negligence in docking at the wrong stage of the tide was found to
have caused the collision. The tugs provided by the charterers were
assisting in docking. An argument was made that this was the
chartdrer's liability. The court rejected this contention on the basis
of previous decisions and exonerated the charterers from all liability.
The terms of the charter were the same as in The Volund.
49
45. Id.
46. The Volund, 181 F. 643 (2d Cir. 1910).
47. The court stated:
Since the navigation remains in the hands of the owner, all instrumentalities (human
or other) which he uses to conduct it are his own while thus employed, no matter
from what source he obtains them. We have no question here as to navigation in
waters where the law compels the employment of some local pilot. For the conse-
quences which may result from the failure of any of these instrumentalities properly
to do the work the owner who is employing them may be liable; he cannot escape
liability for damages done by his vessel in consequence of her being improperly
navigated because the person at fault was temporarily assigned by someone else to
assist him in doing the work which was distinctively his own. Nor can we assent to
the proposition, which is earnestly contended for, that under charterparties of this
sort there is some joint, two-headed navigation of the vessel which will put both
parties in control....
Id. at 666;
48. Luckenbach v. Insular Line, 186 U.S. 327 (2d Cir. 1911).
49. The court said:
It has been repeatedly held that this form of time charter is not a demise of the
.ship. It is sufficient to refer to our recent decision in The Volund, 181 F. 643, where
we held that the navigation of the ship during the time of the charter is in the hands
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The cases discussed above continue to be cited as authoritative.
An arbitration decision in 1943 by one of the leading admiralty
lawyers in New York reached the same conclusion.50 In Black Gull,
a vessel under time charter was under the command of a pilot
provided by the charterers. The pilot was a regular employee of the
charterer and had been frequently used, not only in docking the
charterer's vessels, but with other vessels. The pilot made a miscal-
culation while the vessel was docking and the vessel collided with
the pier doing serious damage to the pier. The owner attempted to
have the liability assessed against the charterers. The arbitrator held
that under the time charter all responsibility for navigation fell upon
the owners; it made no difference that the actual operation of the
vessel was being controlled by a pilot supplied by the charterers .5
The fact that time charterers are entitled to give instructions as to
what voyages the vessel is to make, which the master is obligated to
follow, does not put the time charterers in the same position as




There is no specific provision in the German Commercial Code
which applies to a time charter of a vessel. Accordingly, the deter-
mination of the character of that contract is subject to the judgment
of the owner. We consider the docking of the vessel a part of her navigation.
The master was in control of her, and if her condition was such that it was unsafe
to undertake that operation in that state of the tide, he should have waited until
the condition was more propitious. Many authorities are cited on appellant's brief
in support of his contention that the charterer was in control of the navigation of
the vessel for purpose of docking here, and that the rugs were consignee's agents,
for whose negligence it would be liable, we find in none of the cases cited anything
to induce a modification of the conclusions expressed in The Volund.
Id. at 328.
50. Black Gull - Damage to Pier 50A at San Francisco, 1947 A.M.C. 156.
51. The arbitrator stated:
If the owner is to remain responsible for navigation, the pilot in navigating the
vessel is in the owner's employ although in the general employ of the charterer. It
is not uncommon for an individual in the general employment of one person to
become pro hac vice the employee of another.
Id. at 157. The Volund, supra note 46, is an example of just such a situation.
52. In Volund, the same argument was made and rejected. The court said:
The provisions (clauses 8, 10) that the captain shall be under the orders and direction
of the charterers as regards employment and other arrangements merely authorize
the charterer to designate the safe port, and the berth therein to which the ship
proceed. How shall he navigate to get there is a matter entirely within the owner's
hands.
Volund, supra note 46, at 666.
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of the court or to the theories of scholars in Germany.
The Supreme Court of West Germany rendered judgment on
November 26, 195613 to determine whether the charterer of a vessel
under a Deuzeit time charterplay (the content of which is substan-
tially similar to Balentime charterparty form), used under the char-
terer's name for his sea carrying business, comes within the category
of Ausriister as provided for in Article 510 of the German Com-
mercial Code. 54
In the Court's view of the German Commercial Code, where the
master, crew, or pilot commit negligence in the carrying work related
to navigation of the vessel resulting in damage to a third person or
vessel, Article 510 will not apply. The owner, the lessor of the vessel
(including a bareboat charterer), or the time charterer by demise,
however, as their employer will have to bear liability for damage to
the third party in accordance with Article 485 of the German Com-
mercial Code.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of West Germany rendered judg-
ment on December 12, 195755 in another case, deciding whether the
legal position of the time charterer who chartered the vessel by the
Baletime charterparty form 1936 comes within the category of Aus-
rster as provided for in Article 510 of the Commercial Code. 56
53. 22 SuPRnmE CouRT CAsE BOOK 200.
54. The Court held:
In order to say that whether or not the user of the vessel is the Ausriister as
provided for in Article 510 of The Commercial Code, even where the user of the
vessel control indirectly the vessel and he relies on it by the act of the master, he,
at that time will have to absolutely be servant of the user and he also will have to
follow entirely to user's instruction as he is subordinate to the user.
That is, by the Deuzeit time charterparty, unless some specific clause contains in
it the charterer cannot give his instruction directly to the master of the vessel,
accordingly, although if the charterer has some dissatisfaction to the acts of the
master, he can affect only his intention to the master through the act of the owner
of the vessel, so long as the charterer chartered the vessel by Deuzeit time charterparty
from, the owner still retains his power to instruct directly to the master and crew
as his servants.
The Deuzeit time charterparty does not contain any element to indicate that the
owner transfer legally his right to the charterer, by which the charterer can conduct
the vessel by the act of the master.
Id.
55. 26 SuPuamE CoURT CASE BOOK 152.
56. The Court stated:
Whether or not the contents of general form of Baletime charterparty 1936 contains
a clause relating to a position of Ausrfister as provided for in Article 510 of The
Commercial Code is similar to that of Deuzeit time charterparty form, a problem
concerning Ausritsier could not be found from the contents of Baletime charterparty
form and as stated before, the contents of the employment clause of the charterparty
does not involve any element to support legal position of the time charterer as the
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In 1901, the Supreme Court of Germany characterized the time
charterparty as a combined agreement consisting of both the agree-
ment for lease of the vessel and the agreement for the supply of
service of the master and crew of the vessel. 57 The court clearly
found that in a contract of time charterparty the owner must deliver
to the charterer: (1) the hull of the vessel; and (2) the supply of the
service of the master and crew.
This type of contract by charterparty, as described by the Supreme
Court of Germany, does not fall within the usual form of time
charter contract, but more closely resembles a time charter by demise.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Germany should
not operate as precedent in the interpretation of a charter by time
charter contract of the type prevalent in the shipping industry of the
world today.
D. French Law
Under French law, charterparties are categorized into three types:
(1) The voyage charterparty (affretement au voyage):
A contract by which a shipowner puts a ship, either in whole or
in part, at the charterer's disposal for a voyage or a series of
voyages.58.
(2) Time charterparty (affretement & temp):
A contract by which a shipowner undertakes to put a manned and
equipped ship at the charterer's disposal for a specified period of
time.59
(3) Bareboat charterparty (affretement coque nue):
A contract by which a shipowner hires a non-manned, non-equipped
or only partly-manned and partially-equipped ship to a charterer for
a specified time.60
In categories (1) and (2) above, customarily, the parties define in
the convention of affreightment the possession and control of the
Ausriister. In view of the above, in the case of the ship's collision, the owner of
the vessel as the employer of the master and crew must bear a liability to pay
damage suffered by the opponent party due to the negligence committed by his
master and crew.
Id.
57. See Tanigawa, The Legal Constitution of Time Charterparty, 72 LAW lNsTTuTioN J.
274.
58. Article 5 and 6 - Law June 18, 1966 (copy on file at the offices of the author).
59. Article 7, Law June 18, 1966 (copy on file at the offices of the author).
60. Article 10, Law June 18, 1966 (copy on file at the offices of the author).
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ship, outlining all questions related to the employment of the master
and crew and the management of the ship.
When the master and crew remain under the control of the
shipowner as his servants for the navigation of the ship, the charterer
is not liable for physical damage or injury to any third party when
caused by negligent navigation of the ship. This is always the case
for time charters where a distinction is made between nautical man-
agement (gestion nautique) of the vessel which is incumbent upon
shipowner, and the commercial management (gestion commercial)
which is incumbent upon the charterer.
French domestic law, in its section concerning contracts of af-
freightment, provides that the terms and the effect of the contract
are agreed upon by the parties. French law also dictates that it is
only in absence of contractual stipulations that the effect of the
contract is governed by the provisions of the law, and by the
provisions of a complementary decret enacted for the application of
the law. This means that, in matters of contracts of affreightment,
the parties have complete freedom to insert any clause governing the
relations between them, to the exception of course of clauses con-
flicting with French public policy.61
In contrast when there is a demise of the ship (affretement coque
nue) the charterer is liable for damage or injury sustained by a third
party. The charterer retains control of the master and crew who have
become his servants for the navigation of the vessel. Consequently,
the charterer warrants the owner against any claim by third persons
which may arise from the operation of the vessel.62
E. Dutch Law
The information having been obtained and the vessel having been
let by bareboat charter, the bareboat charterers in their turn may let
the vessel by time charter to another charterer. The time charterparty
is listed on the form issued by the Kobe Shipping Exchange in 1927,
as revised in July 1971.
61. General principles of contract are fully valid under French law as are the following
provisions found in the decret which implements the law.
Article 19: The owner undertakes to deliver the ship-properly manned and equipped.
Article 20: The owner remains in charge of the navigation of the ship.
(Copy on file at the offices of the author.)
62. In this respect, the decret provides in Article 28, paragraph 2, that: "the charterer
recruits the crew, whose wages and for whose food he pays, incidental expenses are being for
him to pay." (Copy on file at the offices of the author.)
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For example, a vessel collided with an oil pier in 1974. The pier
owner instituted legal proceedings against the time charterers for the
damage. Under Dutch law, the question of liability in these circum-
stances would be governed by Article 320,63 536 and 544a of the
Dutch Commercial Code (Wetbock Van Koopphande. 64
There is no doubt that the time charterer is not the operator of
the vessel in the sense of Article 320, because, according to clause 6
of the time charterparty form, the wages of seamen are paid by the
bareboat charterer and not by the time charterers. According to
clause 9, paragraph 3, the money which the master borrowed, shall
be deducted from the hire; so, it is considered as money borrowed
by the bareboat charterers, not by the time charterers. According to
clause 12, paragraph 2, bareboat charterers can also instruct the
master.
The bareboat charterers, not the time charterers, are entitled to
change the master, if a justifiable request by the time charterers is
made. Therefore, it follows from the charterparty that the time
charterers do not command the ship themselves, and that they do
not have it commanded by a master in their service. In short, they
are not the "operators" of the vessel.
Therefore, under Dutch law, the pier owners cannot hold the time
charterers liable, since those time charterers are not the operators of
the vessel. Dutch law assumes that the master of the vessel has been
63. Article 320 reads in translation:
The term 'operator' shall mean and include the person who uses a ship in navigation
at sea and commands her himself, or has her command by a master in his service.
Consequently, this article introduces the term 'operator.'
See legal opinion of Mr. Jean Marot, Attorney, on 5th June 1980, Senior Partner of Marot-
Lassez in Paris, France, on the legal position of the time charterer under French law (copy
on file at the offices of the author).
64. Article 536 of Dutch Commercial Code is part of the section dealing with collisions.
It reads, in translation:
If one of the ship which were in collision or another ship is to blame for such
collision, the operator of the ship to which blame attaches, shall be liable for the
whole of the loss or damage.
Consequently, the liability is limited to the operator of the ship, and to no one else.
Article 544a reads, in translation:
1. The provisions of this Section shall apply to like manner to impact or contact
between ships and other movable or immovable objects.
2. A ship which comes into collision with other object fixed or secured in a proper
place and properly lighted, if necessary, shall be liable for any loss or damage,
unless it appears that such collision is not due to fault of the ship.
(Copy on file at the offices of the author.)
It follows from the first paragraph of Article 544a that the rule laid down in Article 536
does not apply only to collisions between vessels, but also extends to collisions between vessels
and fixed objects.
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appointed by the bareboat charterers and not by the actual proprietors
(the use of the word "owner" is avoided here to prevent confusion;
bareboat charterers are often termed "the owner" with respect to
the time charterparty). Although bareboat charterers, as operators,
are liable for the collision damage, the pier owners would be further
able to enforce their claims against the vessel alone, notwithstanding
that the vessel is the property of the proprietors, not of the bareboat
charterers .6
5
The Court of Appeal at the Hague has answered, by judgment of
2 April 1965," the question of what is meant by "the use of the
ship in navigation at sea by a person other than the proprietors."
The court ruled this to be the use by the bareboat charters in whose
service the master is, and that time charterer, who does not appoint
and command the master, definitely does not use the vessel in the
sense of Article 318r.67
F. Swedish Law
The distinctive features of a time charter under Swedish law are
defined in sections 137 and 138 of the Swedish Maritime Code.68
65. This right is based on the following articles of the Dutch Commercial Code, quoted
in translation:
Article 318c:
1. Subject to the provision of Article 318q hereof preferential debts against ship
are:
(1) Costs of execution;
(2) Debts due to the master and the crew arising under their service agreement and
relating to the period during which they have served aboard a ship;
(3) Compensation due for Salvage, Pilotage dues, Canal and Harbour dues and
other shipping dues;
(4) Debts arising from collisions.
Article 318q deal with lower ranking debts.
Article 318r: It reads, in translation:
Claims for debts and moneys due as mentioned in Article 318c and 318q hereof
shall be enforceable as preferential debts against the ship, even if they arise from
the use of the ship in navigation at sea by a person other than the proprietor, unless
such person has no right as against the proprietor so to use the ship and unless the
creditor is not a bona fide creditor.
(Copy on file at the offices of the author.)
66. See NEDEamru s JtnusPRUmDrs, No. 369 (1965); ScmH & ScuLnn No. 55 (1965)
(The "THEO") (copy on file at the offices of the author).
67. See legal opinion of Mr. Theodorus Rys on 1 May 1980, member of Rotterdam Bar
on the legal position of the time charterer under the Dutch law (copy on file at the offices of
the author).
68. These sections, which are identical to the corresponding sections of Danish and
Nonvegian Maritime Codes, read in translation as follows:
Section 137:
In case of time chartering the carier shall, during the time the ship is at disposal
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Clauses 2 and 6 of the relevant charterparty sections are analogous
to section 138, and clause 5 with section 137, of the Swedish Maritime
Code.
Put broadly, the provisions of the form used for the relevant
charterparty are similar to the provisions of the standard form
Balentime 1939, which conforms with Scandinavian Maritime Law.
It is clear that under Swedish Maritime Law the relevant charterparty
will be recognized and classified as a time charterparty.
Under the terms of the relevant charterparty as well as under the
provisions of the Swedish Maritime Code, responsibility falls on the
owner to hire and pay for the master and crew of the vessel. The
master and crew are, thus, the servants of the owner.e6 In addition
the statutes establish that the shipowner is liable for damage caused
by the fault or neglect committed by the master and crew in the
service of the ship.
Swedish law is also clear that under a charterparty the owner shall
pay for the wages of the master and crew, provisions and insurance
of the vessel, and maintain the vessel. Where the owner employs the
master and crew, the time charterers cannot be liable for collisions
between the chartered vessel and other vessels or fixed objects such
as a pier. The fact that under the terms of the charterparty the
master is under the direction of the charterer as to the employment
and voyages of the vessel does not alter the situation. The navigation
of the vessel to carry out the orders of the charterer is always the
responsibility of the master and crew, for whose fault and negligence
the owner is liable.70
of the charterer, carry out the voyages which are ordered by the charterer pursuant
to the contract.
Section 138:
The carrier shall make provision for the ship to be in such condition, so manned,
equipped and supplied as ordinary trade required. He shall not have to supply fuel
for the ship's engines or boiler water.
(Copy on file at the offices of the author.)
69. Section 233, paragraph I, of the Swedish Maritime Code, identical to the corresponding
section of the Danish and Norwegian Maritime Codes, reads in translation:
Section 233:
The ship owner shall be liable for damage caused by the fault of neglect in service,
committed by master, mariners, pilot, tug or any other person performing work in
the service of the ship.
(Copy on file at the offices of the author.)
70. See legal opinion of Mr. Lennart Hagberg, Swedish lawyer, Senior Partner of
Mannheimer & Zetterlof, made on 9 May 1980, on the legal position of time charter under
Swedish law (copy on file at the offices of the author).
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G. Norwegian Law
The only question to be discussed here is only whether in principle.
the time charterers can be held responsible for the damage to fixed
objects caused by vessels which they have on time charterparty.
Section 233 of the Norwegian Maritime Code of 20 July 1893, as
amended on 7 April 1932, reads as follows:
Chapter 10:
Shipowner's Liability:
1) Vicarious Liability of the shipowner;
Section 233: The shipowner shall be liable for damage caused by
the fault or neglect in service, committed by the master, mariners,
pilot, tug or any other person performing work in Service of the
ship.
The shipowner shall have recourse against the person who caused
the damage in respect of any sum paid by reason hereof.
However, the statutory rules providing relief for the person who
caused the damage by limiting his liability to the person who suffered
the damage shall apply correspondingly to the shipowner's claim.
The Norwegian Maritime Code contains no definition of the word
"shipowner," but it always has been accepted by Norwegian maritime
law scholars that the word "shipowner" means the actual registered
owner of the vessel-or when the vessel is let on a bareboat char-
terparty-the bareboat charterer. Scholars maintain that the bareboat
charterer is the party who has the employment contract with the
master of the vessel.
The English translation of the Norwegian Maritime Code says that
it is the shipowner "who is responsible," but this translation is to
sortie extent inaccurate since the word ifi the original Norwegian text,
namely the word "reder," has no corresponding English translation.
The leading maritime scholar in Norway, Professor Dr. Juris Sjur
Braekhus, in an article about the vicarious liability of the shipowner
according to Scandinavian law, writes the following about the word
"owners" of section 233 of the Maritime Code (section 233 was at
fhat time section 8):
1) Term Owner:
(a) According to the maritime codes, (section 8) it is the "reder"
who is liable for the faults and neglects of those on board. The
"reder" has above been translated to mean "owner" (shipowner).
This translation is not quite exact. The "owner" (under section 8)
is he who manages the vessel, engages the crew and carries the
financial risk of the vessel's tradings. Normally the ship is also his
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property, but not necessarily so. The proprietor of the ship may
have let it out for hire and it may have been requisitioned from
him; the lessee or the requisitioning authority, who has manned the
ship and commissioned it for service, is then the "owner" and
liable for the faults and neglect of those on board ("chartered
owner," "requisitioned owner").
71
Ordinary chartering, whether on a voyage basis or on a time basis,
does not alter the position of the owner. The charterer does not
become the employer of the crew, and is not liable for their fault
and negligence.
Professor Dr. Juris Sjur Braekhus' opinion has been the prevailing
view of maritime law scholars for many years, although it has been
questioned. This author knows of no legal decision which holds the
time charterer responsible for collision damage between vessels or
between a vessel and a fixed object. And, as far as it is known, it
has never been argued that time charterers should be responsible for
such damage.
Under Norwegian law, there is no doubt that the time charterers
are not responsible for damage to third parties, even if they may
have a right to give orders to the master with respect to the voyages
that the vessel shall perform.72
H: Danish Law
The general position of Danish law on time charterers under the
Maritime Act, section 233, states that the owners of the vessel are
liable for damage due to misconduct or negligence of the master,
the crew, the pilot or other engaged in running the vessel.
As to the understanding of the term "owner" in the context of
this section, it is generally agreed in Danish legal theory that it shall
be construed as "managing owners," indicating the legal or physical
person that mans and commissions the vessel for service. The rea-
soning behind this understanding of the section is that the person
that is the employer of the master and crew and the manager of the
vessel should also bear the liability that follows from the activity of
the vessel and crew. Applying this construction to bareboat and time
charterparties normally leaves no doubt that the bareboat charterer
71. BRAEKiws, JuRIDiSKE ARBE ER PEA 3S0 O LAND 328.
72. See legal opinion of Dr. Ole Lund, President of Northern Shipowners Defence made
on 12 May 1980, on the legal position of time charterer in Norway (copy on file at the offices
of the author).
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and not the time charterer is the managing owner of the vessel. The
bareboat charterers normally employ the master and the crew, and
they have the authority to instruct and command them. Thus, the
bareboat charterer is responsible for the nautical running of the
vessel.
The time charterer has a very limited scope of power to instruct
the master and the crew, namely the right to decide within certain
limits, where the vessel shall sail. This right of the time charterer to
govern the commercial side of the running of the vessel, however,
does n6t change the fact that the bareboat charterer is solely respon-
sible for the nautical operation of the vessel. Under Danish law, the
failure of the master to secure the anchor and the vessel properly to
lay safely in a typhoon, for example-if an error at all-is an error
in the navigation of the vessel, for which the time charterers cannot
be held responsible2 3
I. Swiss Law
Swiss Sea Navigation Law article 94, paragraph 1 provides:
By the charterparty of the vessel, owner or management owner, as
a tenderer of the ship's space (verfrachter) has a duty to entrust
the use of the vessel to charterer a whole or a part of ship's space
(raumgehalt) of a specific sea going vessel (seeshiff) for a specific
period (time charter) or specific or several voyages (voyage charter),
and the charterer has a duty to pay remuneration thereof.
Article 93, paragraph 2, provides:
A charterparty does not merely mean the contract of affreightment
by sea (seefrachtvertrag).
J. Soviet Law
From a review of the provisions of Soviet Maritime Code,-14 it can
be said that it succeeded from the contents of the Baletime charter-
73. See legal opinion of Mr. Jan P.S. Erland, Partner of the law firm of Gorrissen and
Partners of Cophehagen made on 28 May 1980 (copy on file at the offices of the author).
74. Soviet Maritime Code (Sept. 17, 1968) provides:
Chapter 1. General Provisions, Article 1:
Soviet Maritime Code controls several relations which shall be incurred from maritime
transactions (paragraph 1)..
The maritime transactions in this Code means' acts which relate to the use of the
vessel for a purpose of the transportation of the goods, passengers, luggage and
mall bags, or fishery and other sea industry, collection of useful minerals, tug,
icebreaking works or other purpose of economic, academical and cultural works
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party form, and, therefore, the interpretation thereof should accord
with the decisions of English Courts.
K. Italian Law
Italy has established well-regulated provisions in the Code of
Navigation of 1942 (codice della navigasione) relating to charter of
vessels and airplanes. In that code, the charterparty of a vessel or
airplane is understood as one type of contract for use of a navigable
utensil (veicolo), either ship (nave), or airplane (aeromolile). In Italy,
the contract for the use (impiego) or utilization (utiizzation) of the
vessel, and other navigable utensils is the contract of navigation
(contrati navah). The Code of Navigation of Italy re-named the
contract of navigation, however, to the contract in relation to the
utilization of the navigable utensil (contrati di utillazzione della nave),
and divided the chapter of contract relating to utilization of navigable
utensils into two chapters: one for ships (art. 376 to art. 468) and
(paragraph 2).
Chapter 10, Article 178 provides, in relation to time charter:
By the time charter, the owner of the vessel with the remuneration has a duty to
tender the vessel to the charterer for a specific period for a purpose of the
transportation of the goods or passengers or other purposes of the works as provided
for in Article I of this Code.
Article 179 provides that:
in the conclusion for the time charter, the agreement in writing to be made by the
contract parties is preferential in effect than that of the provisions of this Code.
Article 181 provides:
The owner of the vessel must tender the vessel to the charter with appropriate
condition for use of the vessel complying with a purpose as agreed by the contract
and with appropriate equipment and manned (paragraph I).
The owner of the vessel further during the term of the contract must keep the vessel
in good conditions and pay the provisions for the crew (paragraph 2).
Article 183 provides:
The charterer, in accordance with the terms of time charterparty, uses the vessel
from the commencement of the time of the contract and liable for a responsibility
under the Bills of Lading signed by the master (paragraph 2).
The master shall obey to the instruction of the charterer in relation to the matter
of the voyable of the vessel excluding instruction regarding ship's navigation, the
order in the vessel and organization of the crew members (paragraph 3).
The charterer shall not liable from the salvage of chartered vessel, loss or sinking
of her resulted from the causes which has been incurred from the negligence
committed by the crew, but, it is a case only that the owner employed crew onboard
(paragraph 4).
There are many other provisions of the time charter in the Soviet Maritime Code. Some
examples include: The provisions of the indispensable condition of time charter (Art. 182),
provisions of the responsibility in connection with the unseaworthiness (Art. 184), the provisions
relating to the amount of hire to be paid by the charterer in a case of sinking of the vessel
(Art. 185), and the provisions relating to apportionment of salvage reward (Art. 186).
Translation of Soviet Maritime Code (Sept. 17, 1968) by Mr. Eisuke Yoshinaga and Sotaro
Isikawa (copy on file at the offices of the author).
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one for airplanes (art. 939 to art. 964). Moreover, in each charter,
it provided for the contract of lease, charter of the vessel or airplane
(noleggio), and the transportation of goods.75
VI. THiotims oF ScHoLARs AND COURT CASES IN JAPAN
The theories of scholars in Japan relating to the characteristics of
the time charter break into two general classifications: (1) a contract
of affreightment by the ship; and (2) a lease of the sea enterprise to
be carried by the ship.
A. The Contract of Affreightment
The time charter is one type of voyage charter, because the
charterer does not have possession of the vessel. The charterer is,
therefore, merely a consignor for the carriage of the goods. As a
result, the time charterer has no legal position as provided for in
article 704 of the Japanese Commercial Code.76 Accordingly, a general
rule of contract of affreightment by the ship can be applied to the
time charter. 7 Of course, there are several modified explanations of
the character of the time charter, based on this explanation.
B. The Theory of Transformal Contract of Affreightment78
The time charter is one type of legal contract which exists as an
intermediary substantial entity between the lease of the ship and the
75. Under the Code of Navigation of Italy, 1942:
(i) In the contract of lease of the vessel or airplane, the navigable utensil (ship or airplane)
is deemed as the object of the supply by the contract.
(ii) In the charter of the navigable utensil (ship or airplane), the object of the supply by the
contract is deemed to be the work (opus). Accordingly, the navigable utensil (ship or airplane),
in relation to the work as the object of the supply by the contract, operates as a function of
measures (mezzolstrumento) only to perform the contract. For example, in the navigation of
the vessel or airplane, the navigation itself is deemed as the operation of a function of
measures.
See KUBOTA, INTRODUCTION TO Tnsa CHAATER 109.
76. Article 704 as translated reads:
If the lease of a ship makes her copy on file in navigation for a purpose of engaging
in commercial transactions, he shall in relation to third person have the same rights
and duties as the owner in connection with matters relating to the use of the ship.
2. In the case mentioned in preceding paragraph, any preferential right which has
arisen in connection with the use of the ship shall be effective even as against the
owner of the ship; this shall not, however, apply in cases where the holder of the
preferential right was aware that the use was not in conformity with the contract.
(Copy on file at the offices of the author).
77. See letter opinion of Dr. Tomihisa Ichimura (copy on file at the offices of the author);
MnqAu, NEw CraRTEPAnTY 17; MoRI, Tam PmucWr.us oF THE Mmarrm LAW 134.
78. See TANAKA, TnE SuBsrANcE OF LEcru-nE OF THE MARmrm LAw 96; UGAYA, Tam
EXPLANATION Or nm MARmE LAW 279.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 1
voyage charter. In view of the above, general rules of the contract
of affreightment. will also apply to the time charter.
C. The Theory of Joint Contract9
The time charter is characterized by a joint contract for lease of
the ship and for supply of labor of the crew to the charterer. This
theory depends upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of Germany
in the year of 1901 on the case of charter by demise.80
D. The Theory of the Principle of Estoppel8l
Dr. Sozo Komachiya states that the legal character of the time
charter is a contract of affreightment by the ship. In relation to third
parties, however, and if the third party believes that the time charterer
is the carrier, the time charterer shall be liable to such third party
on a principle of estoppel for any loss, damage, injury suffered by
such third party resulting from any accident, or from negligence
committed by the ship's crew in connection with the carriage of
goods by sea.
To the above explanation of Dr. Sozo Komachiya, the following
critical opinion has been rendered by other scholars in Japan: The
question of the liability on a principle of estoppel is based upon the
facts expressed by an actor to other persons, not on how a third
person believes it was made by the actor.
E. The Theory Based on the Shape of the Use of the Vessel 2
A shape of the use of the vessel by time charter divides the charter
into commercial matters and nautical matters. As to commercial
matters, the charterer maintains control over it and is liable to third
persons. As to nautical matters, however, the owner controls them
and is liable to the third person.83.
F. The Theory of the Lease of Sea Enterprise
This theory was asserted by Dr. Teruhisa Ishii. He states that the
time charterparty includes various specific clauses, such as:
79. See the Judgment of Old Supreme Court of Japan in the Year of 1931; MiNAI cHi,
TRm Twmi CARTERPARTY: TBE SERES oF Coia-RcLAx. LAW 518; Kitamura, A Legal Character
of the Time Charter, 1 The National Economic 19.
80. See generally supra note 57.
81. 1 KomAcHIYA, Tim OunNE oF Tim IARrram LAW 36, 37.
82. Nismrut4, THE OuiNE oF TmH MA~rmta LAW 193, 204.
83. It is said that this theory was reflected by Article 305, paragraph 2 of the draft of
revision of French Commercial Code, 1919 (present Article 7 of Commercial Code, 18 June
1966).
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(1) The general clause which indicates lease of the ship (let, hire
clause);
(2) the clause that the owner place the ship at disposal of the
charterer (disposal clause);
(3) clause of employment of the master and crew (employment
clause);
(4) where the charterer has a dissatisfaction to the service of the
master and crew, the charterer can require to the owner to change
them (misconduct clause); and
(5) the pure chartering clause, such as the charterer bear a costs of
coal, fuel and boiler water (net charter clause).
In the actual international transaction, the time charter has been
made by a form of Baletime Charter 1936 which prevails in the
international shipping industry. From the fact that the above specific
clauses are contained in the time charterparty, it becomes clear that
the owner of the ship will tender the vessel with the master and
crew onboard the ship to the charterer for a certain period, and
the master and crew onboard ship will provide their labor under an
employment contract with them to perform the charterer's business.
In addition, where the ship was transferred to a new owner, the
master and crew also transferred to the new owner with the ship.8
4
The relative position of the ship, and the master and the crew, is
deemed to be a single system of a movable enterprise. In view of
the foregoing, the time charter is considered the lease of the movable ,
enterprise by the owner of the ship to the charterer. 8
G. The Theory of the Lease of One Unit of Constructed System
of Movable Sea Enterprise
This theory is propounded by Professor Mr. Hisashi Tanigawa.
Tanigawa bases his theory oil that of Dr. Teruhisa Ishii. Therefore
his opinion accords with a main point of Ishii's theory.
86
H. The Judgment of Court Cases in Japan
1. Lower Court Cases
The first judgment rendered by the lower court in connection with
the time charter was in the year of 1909. Since then, and until the
year of 1921, several more cases in connection with the time charter
.84. See Article 43 of Seamen's Law of Japan (copy on file at the offices of the author).
85. Isim, MArm m LAW 173.
86. TANiOAWA, LEGAL CoNsmtmoN op Tan TWn CiARTERPARTY 617.
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were decided by the lower courts . 7 In all of these cases, the lower
court decided that the time charter is the charter of the ship on the
one hand, or the lease of the ship on the other. Upon this basic
principle the lower court has not yet decided definitively the character
of the time charter.
2. The Judgment of Old Supreme Court of Japan in the Year
of 1922
The Supreme C~urt decided that where the time charterparty
contained specific clauses, such as; (1) the time charterer can direct
to the ship's movement; and (2) if the charterer has some dissatis-
faction to the service of the master and crew he can request the
owner change them, that the character of the time charter is deemed
to be the lease of the ship. 88
3. The Judgment of Old Supreme Court of Japan in the Year
of 1925
The Supreme Court decided that where the time charter is agreed
upon pursuant to the standard form of time charterparty, it becomes
in essence a joint contract consisting of an agreement to lease the
hull of the ship and the agreement to supply the services of the
ship's crew.8 9
4. The Judgment of Old Supreme Court of Japan in the Year
of 1928
The Old Supreme Court of Japan decided, upon investigation of
the clauses contained in the contract of time charter, that where the
charterer takes the possession of the ship from the owner, and
manages his sea transportation business for himself by use of the
87- See Tokyo High Court Judgment as appeal court on the Case, Docket No. (ne) 411,
1912, decided on May 14, 1913; Osaka District Court Judgment on the Case, Docket No.
(wa) 418, 1913, Law News Paper No. 562 at 10; Tokyo High Court, as appeal court case,
Docket No. (ne) 443, 1914, decided by Civil Affairs Division No. 2 on May 20, 1915, Law
News Paper No. 113 at 24; Osaka High Court, as appeal court, Case Docket No. (ne) 69,
1915 decided by Civil Affairs Division No. 2 on September 12, 1916, Law News Paper No.
1326 at 27; Hakodate Appeal Court Case, Docket No. (ne) 9, 1917, decided on July 20, 1917,
Law News Paper No. 1447 at 19 (copy on file at the offices of the author).
88. Old Supreme Court of Japan, Case Docket No. (o) 818, 1921, decided on June 2,
1922 reprinted in Copma RCIAL SECOND CASE BOOK 985 (Komachiya, ed.).
89. Old Supreme Court of Japan, Case Docket No. (o) 502, 1924, decided by Civil Affairs
Division No. 1, on June 28, 1925, reprinted in 7 CiviL CAsE BOOK 519.
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ship, the charter of the vessel is not covered by the Japanese
Commercial Code, but rather by the joint contract consisting of both
the agreement to lease the hull of the ship, and the agreement to
supply the service of the ship's crew.9 This is true even though the
owner can instruct the crew to carry on the ship's navigation, with
his duty to discharge or change employment of the crew being as
agreed in the charterparty and even though the charterer still has a
right to control the navigation of the ship.
There has been no new judgment by the old or the new Supreme
Court of Japan in connection with the character of the time charter
since the year 1928. Accordingly, at present in Japan, the judgment
of the old Supreme Court of Japan in the year of 1928 is the
controlling law.
I. Comment on the Decisions of Old Supreme Court of Japan
1. AS to the Judgment in the Year of 1922
The judgment of the court is based on the facts as found by the
judges of the Supreme Court; however, in my opinion, the judgment
was based upon an insufficient investigation of the facts involved.
Accordingly, this author finds the judgment to be inadequate.
2. As to the Judgment in the Year of 1925
The judgment, in my opinion, reflects the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Germany in 1901. Again, however, the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Germany in 1901 was rendered on the premise
that the character of the charter was deemed to be a lease of the
ship. In contrast to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Germany
in 1901, the Supreme Court of Japan based its judgment on the
clauses contained only in the standard time charterparty form. The
Supreme Court of Japan followed an insufficient study in determining
the meaning of the charter and decided that the joint contract
constituted an agreement both to lease the hull of the ship and to
supply the service of the ship's crew. Arguably, it was a most
inadequate judgment compared to those of the courts outside Japan.
90. Old Supreme Court of Japan, Case Docket No. (o) 502, 1928, decided by Civil Affairs
Division No. 2 on August 7, 1928, reprinted in Law News Paper No. 3311 at 14.
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3. As to the Judgment in the Year of 1928
It is generally known in Japan that this judgment followed that
of the Supreme Court of Germany in 1901. The facts are similar to
those of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Germany, in which
that court concluded that the charterparty is not a voyage charter as
provided for in the Japanese Commercial Code, but rather an agree-
ment for both the lease of hull of the ship and to supply service of
the ship's crew. Again, however, the opinion of the Supreme Court
applies as a precedent to the charter by demise, but not to the
prevailing time charter used in the shipping industry throughout the
world. Even at the present time, the Japanese lower courts, with
some doubt, apply the rule as precedent in Japan in these cases.
CONCLUSION
The theories of the scholars in Japan and the judgments of the
Japanese courts were based on an insufficient understanding of the
character of the time charter. A better view of the character of time
charter reveals:
The time charter is one type of contract allowing use of the ship
by the time charterer to be tendered by the owner of the vessel in
order to carry the business of the charterer under the terms of the
contract for a certain period of time. The owner of the ship does
not transfer the possession of the ship to the charterer. The owner
retains the right to control the ship, and the master and crew, and
agrees to render the service of the ship (such as function or facility)
by the master and crew to the charterer, by which the charterer can
sufficiently carry out his commercial transaction as he intended
(indirect control over the ship by the charterer) for a certain period
of time. In addition to such render of the service of the ship by the
owner, the charterer agrees to pay periodically the agreed amount of
the hire to the owner.
In view of the above, during the term of the time charter, the
owner or disponent owner of the ship must always keep the ship
well-equipped and prepare to tender the vessel in compliance with
the charter terms. During the charter's currency, the owner is bound
to leave from the requirement of the charterer or to take free
movement to the other direction without the charterer's consent.
Against such restraint by the charter to the movement of the ship,
the charterer agrees to pay periodically the hire to the owner or
managing owner computed at the agreed-upon rate of hire and for
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the agreed-upon period, irrespective of whether the ship is on hire
or not.
The time charter is a legal method by which the charterer can
acquire the ship owned by the other person, the vessel being well-
equipped and prepared for good performance, in order to function
in conformity with the use intended by the charterer to carry on his
sea enterprise. The objects of the contract to be supplied by the
owner to the charterer under the time charterparty, however, do not
include the ship and the labor of the ship's crew on board the ship,
but only the function or facility of the ship which belongs with the
vessel as its specific character in a satisfactory condition.
In addition, we must analyze the legal meaning of the function or
facility of the ship. A function or facility of the ship does not merely
mean a function or facility of the respective machinery or other
equipment (such as navigable equipment, engine equipment, radar or
correspondence equipment, or loading or discharging equipment, etc).
Rather, it means the function or facility of the ship which is produced
by this equipment together with the expertise of the master and crew
who are well-educated, well-trained, and well-experienced for the
navigation of the ship. Accordingly, the function or facility of the
ship means that which master and crew produce by use of the the
ship's equipment to conform with the purposes of the charterer's sea
enterprise, e.g., the service (ekimu in Japanese) of the ship which
shall.be rendered by the master and crew under the time charterparty.

